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SNOW AND ICE
A Discussion of Liability Under the Laws of New York
JOaN T. DEGRAFF
Almost every lawyer is called upon at some time to determine the
liability for an injury caused by a fall on an accumulation of snow or
ice. In spite of the frequency of such accidents there are few fields in
the law where the reported cases are more confusing and contradic-
tory. There has been, strange to say, no comprehensive analysis of the
law in the text books or law reviews.
The attorney who attempts to determine liability in any given case
from a search of the reports is immediately confronted with a maze of
apparent inconsistencies. Cases arising in Greater New York' can-
not be relied upon as precedents in other sections of the State.2 Some
authorities indicate that there is no liability unless there are "mounds
or ridges of unusual size",3 while others impose liability though no
mounds or ridges are present.4 In one city an abutting property owner
may be liable for injuries resulting from a fall on a sidewalk because
of his failure to clean the sidewalk within the time required by a local
ordinance,5 while in another city failure to comply with a similar or-
dinance imposes no liability.6 In some cases liability turns upon the
question whether there has been an "interference with nature"7 al-
though in others this question is of no significance.8
Much of the confusion is caused by the tendency to consider all
snow and ice cases in the same category and the failure to recognize
'Williams v. City of New York, 214 N. Y. 259, io8 N. E. 448 (915).
2Mitchell v. Village of Dannemora, 178 App. Div. 239, 164 N. Y. Supp. 9,7
(3d Dept. 1917). V.LAGE LAW (1927) § 34I-a; TOWN LAW (1934) § 130, subd.
4; SECOND CLASS Cimrs LAW (i9o6) § 244.
3Dwyer v. Woollard, 2o5 App. Div. 546, i98 N. Y. Supp. 840 (3d Dept. 1923).
Anthbny v. Village of Glens Falls, 4 App. Div. 218, 41 N. Y. Supp. 1105 (3d
Dept. I896); Buck v. Village of Glens Falls, 4 App. Div. 323, 38 N. Y. Supp.
582 (3d Dept. i896).
'City of Rochester v. Campbell, 123 N. Y. 4o5, 25 N. E. 937 (189o) ; Williams
v. City of New York, 214 N. Y. 259, io8 N. E. 448 (1915) ; Jankowsky v. Brown,
177 App. Div. 602, 164 N. Y. Supp. 303 (Ist Dept. 1917).
5
'Willis v. Parker, 225 N. Y. 159, 12o N. E. 81o (I919).
'City of Rochester v. Campbell, 123 N. Y. 405, 25 N. E. 937 (i89o).
'Tremblay v. Harmony Mills, 171 N. Y. 598, 64 N. E. 5o (902) ; Crounse
v. Sager, 224 App. Div. 1o 229 N. Y. Supp. 451 (3d Dept. 1928) ; Parsons v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 233 App. Div. 195, 251 N. Y. Supp. 36o (4th
Dept. 1931).
'Gaffney v. City of New York, 218 N. Y. 225, 112 N. E. 725 (I916) ; Rankin
v. Ittner Realty Co. Inc., 242 N. Y. 339, i5I N. E. 641 (1926).
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that such cases are of at least three distinct types. They may be con-
veniently classified as follows:
(I) Actions against municipalities for injuries on sidewalks.sa
(2) Actions against abutting owners for injuries on sidewalks.
(3) Actions against property owners for injuries on their prem-
ises.
Since actions in one of the above classes are frequently confused
with precedents referring to a different class, it is essential to con-
sider the fundamental principles of law underlying each type of action.
I. ACTIONS AGAINST MUNICIPALITIES FOR INJURIES ON
SIDEWALKS
The primary obligation to maintain sidewalks in a reasonably safe
condition is upon the municipality. The measure of its duty is "reason-
able care". 9 The nature of the duty is explained in Taylor v. City of
Yonkers,9 a where the Court said:
"It often happens that in a single day or night, every street and
sidewalk in a city or village is covered with a heavy fall of snow.
It is not expected and cannot be required that the corporation shall
itself forthwith employ laborers to dean all the walks, and so ac-
complish the object by a slow and expensive process, when the
result may be effected more swiftly and easily by imposing that
a"Sidewalk", as used in the discussion, refers to walks used by the public as
distinguished from walks on private property. Although the word "sidewalk" is
often used loosely to refer to all walks, public as well as private, it is defined by
Webster as "a walk for foot passengers at the side of a street or road".
'Walsh v. City of Buffalo, 17 App. Div., 112, 44 N. Y. Supp. 942 (4th Dept.
1897) ; Van Dyne v. Village of Seneca Falls, 227 App. Div. 140, 237 N. Y. Supp.
355 (4th Dept. 1929) ; Collins v. City of New York, 185 App. Div. 586, 173 N. Y.
Supp. 451 (2d Dept. 1918) ; Klaus v. City of Buffalo, 86 App. Div. 221, 83 N. Y.
Supp. 62o (4th Dept. 19o3) ; Penor v. City of Glens Falls, 138 App. Div. 671,
22 N. Y. Supp. 1O72 (3d Dept. igio) ; Mitton v. City of Syracuse, 172 App. Div.
39, 158 N. Y. Supp. 47o (4th Dept. 1916) ; Keane v. Waterford, 13o N. Y. 188,
29 N. E. 130 (i891); Bishop v. Goshen, 12o N. Y. 337, 24 N. E. 72o (189o);
Powers v. Moravia, 123 App. Div. 19i, io8 N. Y. Supp. i59 ( 4 th Dept. i9o8);
Morris v. Saratoga Springs, 55 App. Div. 263, 66 N. Y. Supp. 821 (3d Dept.
x9oo) ; Thompson v. Saratoga Springs, 22 App. Div. 186, 217 N. Y. Supp. o32
(3d Dept. 1892); Berger v. New York, 65 App. Div. 394, 73 N. Y. Supp. 74
(ist Dept. i9oi) ; O'Hara v. Brooklyn, 57 App. Div. 176, 68 N. Y. Supp. 210 (2d
Dept. i9o) ; Deufel v. Long Island City, i9 App. Div. 62o, 46 N. Y. Supp. 355
(2d Dept. 1897); Stone v. Poughkeepsie, 15 App. Div. 582, 44 N. Y. Supp. 6og
(4th Dept. 897); Conklin v. Elmira, ii App. Div. 4o2, 42 N. Y, Supp. 518 (2d
Dept. 1897); Hawley v. Gloversville, 4 App. Div. 343, 42 N. Y. Supp. 518 (3d
Dept. 1896); Stapleton v. Newburgh, 9 App. Div. 39, 41 N. Y. Supp. 96 (2d
Dept. 1896). This obligation, of course, includes the highway itself as well as the
sidewalks. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (934) §349. 'a,05 N. Y. 2=2 (1887).
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duty upon the citizens. Each can promptly and without unreason-
able burden clean the snow from his own premises, and the
authorities may justly and lawfully require that to be done under
the jurisdiction conferred by their charters. But though the
municipality makes the necessary regulation it is not thereby re-
lieved from responsibility. The duty remains, and it must, there-
fore, see to it that its ordinance is obeyed. It is entitled, however,
to a reasonable time within which to perform the duty in the man-
ner permitted, and is not guilty of negligence, if, observing that
the work is being generally done, it awaits for a reasonable period
the action of the citizens. But when such reasonable time has been
given, the corporation must compel the adjoining owners or occu-
pants to act, or do the work itself, and if it suffers the obstruction
to remain thereafter, with notice, actual or constructive, of its
existence, it may become responsible for injuries resulting."
A concise summary of the principles of law applicable to actions
against municipal corporations may be found in City of Rochester v.
Campbell."° The obligation imposed at common law has also found
expression in the statutes.1
10I23 N. Y. 405, 410 '(x89o) : "The principles governing actions of this general
character have been the subject of frequent consideration in the courts of this
and other states, as well as the federal tribunals; and certain propositions may
safely be assumed, in the further consideration of the case, as being too well
settled to require argument or citation to support them. Among these are the
following: (i) That municipal corporations in this state are charged with the
care, custody and control of the streets and highways within their limits, and
the duty, primarily, rests upon them to keep such streets and highways in repair,
so that they may be safely traveled upon by all having occasion to use them, and
this duty is based upon the contract implied through the acceptance of a charter
by such corporation from the state, devolving upon them the performance of such
duties. (Conrad v. Village of Ithaca, 16 N. Y., I58; Saulsbury v. Village of
Ithaca, 94 id. 27). (2) That such corporations are liable for damages arising
from a neglect to perform this duty, in an action ex- delicto, to persons lawfully
using such streets and sidewalks, notwithstanding a duty to repair is also
imposed upon the property owners in front of whose premises the injury oc-
curred. (Russell v. Village of Canastota, 98 N. Y. 496; State v. Gorham, 37 Me.
457; Gridley v. Bloomington, 88 Ill. 554;" Robbins v. City of Chicago, 4 Wall,
657; Saulsbury v. Village of Ithaca, 94 N. Y. 27). (3) If a municipal corporation
has been compelled to pay a judgment for damages recovered by a traveler for
injuries sustained from a defect or obstruction in one of its highways, which
defect or obstruction was created by the wilful act or negligence of a third
person, it may maintain an action against such third person for reimbursement,
and the rule is the same when it has paid an undoubted liability without suit.
THomPsoN, NEGLIGENCE, 789; City of Rochester v. Montgomery, 72 N. Y. 65;
Village of Fulton v. Tucker, 3 Hun, 529. (4) So, also, if the municipality has
provided by contract with third persons for keeping its street in repair, and has
been, through a neglect by such party to perform his contract; subjected to dam-
ages at the suit of an injured party, it may recover from such party the sum which
it has thus been compelled to pay. (5) The measure of damages in such cases is
the loss sustained by the injured party, and paid by the municipality with such
incidental expenses as may have been incurred in defending the action. Tios'-
soN, NEGLIGENcE, 791; City of Brooklyn v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 47 N. Y.
476). (6) That no obligation to repair streets or sidewalks rests upon the lot
owners at common law, but the duty to do so, if any arises out of the statutory
obligations imposed by the state or municipality upon them. Village of Fulton v.
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A municipality may require abutting owners to remove snow and
ice from sidewalks within a reasonable time and it has been held that
a village or city ordinance, making it unlawful for abutting owners to
allow snow and ice to collect and remain on the sidewalk so as to im-
pede and render dangerous public travel thereon, and prescribing a
penalty therefor, is a proper exercise of the police power.12 The fol-
lowing is typical of ordinances that have been enacted generally by
cities and villages throughout the State:
"It shall not be lawful for any owner, occupant, tenant, or any
person having the charge or control of any premises, lot, tenement,
or manufacturing establishment, situated within the village of
Carthage, to suffer or permit any snow, ice, or other substance,
to collect and remain on any sidewalk fronting on or belonging to
said premises so as to impede, obstruct, or render dangerous, pub-
lic travel upon such walks later than IO o'clock in the forenoon
of any day after the same shall have fallen or collected thereon, or
for more than two hours after being notified by the president or
any of the trustees of said village to remove the same. Any person
or persons offending against the provisions of this act shall be
liable to pay a fine of not less than one dollar and not to exceed
Tucker, 3 Hun, 529; DLmLON, MU CPAL CopoRATioNs, § i12. (7) When a
corporation is sued for damages arising out of defects and obstructions in its
streets and highways, created and continued by third persons, against whom
the corporation has a cause of action for reimbursement, it may impose the burden
of defending such actions upon such persons by notice, and in case they do not
defend successfully, or neglect to make any defense, they are bound by the result
of such suit, and cannot in any subsequent litigation between themselves and the
corporation successfully dispute the material facts on which the adjudication
rests. City of Rochester v. Montgomery, 72 N. Y. 65; Village of Port Jervis
v. First Nat. Bank of Port Jervis, 96 id. 550.'
'SECOND CLASS Cirrus LAw (i9o6) §§ 91, 92. § g2 is typical:
"The commissioner of public works shall have full power and authority to
require the owner of property abutting upon a street to repair any sidewalk in
front thereof or bring the same to true grade, 'and to remove the snow and ice
therefrom. * * * or where the owner of any such premises shall fail or neglect
to remove snow and ice from any such sidewalk after the same has remained
thereon for more than twelve hours, and the commissioner shall have repaired
such sidewalk or brought the same to grade or removed the ice or snow there-
from, a bill for the expenses incurred thereby shall be presented to the owner
personally, or by leaving the same at his residence, or, if he be a non-resident,
by mailing the same to him at his last known place of residence, or if the name of
such owner or his place of residence can not be ascertained after due diligence,
by posting the same in a conspicuous place on the premises; and, if he shall fail
to pay the same within ten days thereafter, the commissioner shall file each year
immediately preceding the time for making the annual assessment-roll his cer-
tificate of the actual cost of the work, together with a statement as to the property
in front of which the repairing or grading or cleaning was done, with the asses-
sors of the city, who shall, in the preparation of the next assessment-roll of
general city taxes, assess such amount upon such property, and the same shall
be levied, corrected, enforced and collected in the same manner, by the same
proceedings, at the same time, under the same penalties and having the same
lien upon the property assessed as the general city tax and as a part thereof."
See also VILLAGE LAW (1897) §§ 141, 163; TowN LAw (1934) § 130, subd. 4.
'Village of Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268, 25 N. E. 48o (18go).
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ten dollars for each and every offense, to be sued for and collected
the same as other penalties, with costs of suit."13 [Italics the
author's.]
The delegation of responsibility by ordinance does not however,
relieve the city from its primary obligation. Although a municipality
may await,- for a reasonable period, the action of its citizens, it must
see that the ordinance is obeyed within a reasonable time or do the
work itself.' 4 If the city has actual or constructive notice of the exis-
tence of a dangerous condition, and fails to remedy it within a reason-
able time, the city is liable, in spite of the fact that it has imposed an
ordinance requiring the abutting owner to correct the condition.' 5
The hardship in requiring a municipality, particularly small com-
munities in the northern part of the state, to assume responsibility for
the condition of several miles of sidewalks within its limits has long
been recognized.' 6 The onerous duty imposed upon smaller munici-
'The ordinance quoted is a municipal ordinance of the Village of Carthage,
§ 29. In upholding this ordinance, the court said in Village of Carthage v. Fred-
erick, 122 N. Y. 268, 277, 25 N. E. 480, 482 (189o) :
"In this latitude the accumulation of snow upon sidewalks in large quantities
is a matter of course. Its presence retards travel, interrupts business and inter-
feres with the safety and convenience of all classes. It is a frequent cause of
accidents and thus affects the property of every person who is liable to assessment
to pay the damages caused by a failure to remove it. But how is it possible for
the authorities of a large city, with many hundred miles of streets, to remove the
snow in time to prevent injury to those who have the right to, travel upon the
sidewalks unless they can require the owners and occupants of adjacent property
to remove it? Every man can conveniently and promptly attend to that which is in
front of his door, and it is both reasonable and necessary that he should be com-
pelled to do so. We think that the ordinance under consideration is valid, that it
conflicts with no provision of the Constitution, and that it is the duty of the courts
to enforce it."
'Taylor v. City of Yonkers, 1O5 N. Y. 202, II N. E. 642 (1887); Harrington
v. City of Buffalo, 121 N. Y. 147, 24 N. E. 186 (189o).
t
'Taylor v. City of Yonkers, 105 N. Y. 202, II N. E. 642 (1887); Harrington
v. City of Buffalo, 121 N. Y. I47, 24 N. E. 186 (189o) ; Gaffney v. City of New
York, 218 N. Y. 225, 112 N. E. 725 (I916) ; Johnson v. City of Buffalo, 178 App.
Div. 295, i65 N. Y. Supp. 372 (4th Dept. 1917).
"In Mitchell v. Village of Dannemora, 178 App. Div. 239, 164 N. Y. Supp. 917
(3d Dept. 1917) the court said:
"The left-hand walk, upon which the accident occurred, had been shoveled
after every storm; it was a cement walk, about six feet wide, and was shoveled
the width of the walk to the gutter, so that water could run off. During a snow-
storm, or if it took place in the night, before the men could shovel it in the morn-
ing, the snow became packed down by travelers, with the result that when the
men came to remove the snow with iron shovels, they could not remove it all
down to the cement, but there was hard snow and ice accumulated upon the
walk to a depth of from two to five inches, which snow and ice had been accumu-
lating during the winter so the center of the walk was higher than at the edges,
forming a ridge, the center being two to three inches higher than at the edges of
the walk. On some streets in the village the walks were not shoveled at all, and
apparently this walk was the best kept walk in the village, as it furnished the
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palities by the common law rule has been removed by statute. The
Second Class Cities Law, section 244, now provides:
"But no such action shall be maintained for damages or injuries
to the person sustained solely in consequence of the existence of
snow or ice upon any sidewalk, crosswalk or street, unless writ-
ten notice thereof, relating to the particular place, was actually
given to the commissioner of public works and there was a failure
or neglect to cause such snow or ice to be removed, or the place
otherwise made reasonably safe within a reasonable time after
the receipt of such notice." (Italics the author's.)
In 1927, an identical provision was enacted in section 341-a of the
Village Law.
The strict prohibition of these statutes has been, to some extent,
liberalized by judicial construction. The courts have drawn a distinc-
tion between cases where the dangerous condition was created by the
municipality and cases where the dangerous condition was caused by
agencies for which the municipality was not responsible.17 It has been
principal communication between the State buildings and the railroad.
"I think it is a recognized fact, in the northern part of the State, that during
the winter a cement sidewalk is safer with the snow upon it than if kept clear of
snow. It is also a known fact that it is difficult to prevent a ridge through the
center of a cement walk, caused by the snow being packed down by travelers and
the difficulty of removing the snow down to the cement. It is also a matter of
common experience in the villages and the small cities in the northern part of the
State, that many days during the winter pedestrians find it safer to walk in the
center of the street than upon the sidewalks to avoid the icy conditions of the
walk.
"This little village did not guarantee the safety of its walks or indemnify the
people traveling upon them, and was not responsible for the severity of the winter
or the climate. I think the evidence indicates that this street was as well kept as
streets in villages of its size in the same general locality. The same rule of
liability cannot be applied to a small municipality in the northern part of the
State, during the severe winter weather, and to large cities in the southern part
of the State. * * *
"Undoubtedly the walk was more or less dangerous; but the village walks in
the northern part of the State are usually more or less dangerous in winter
weather. We cannot say, however, that it was 'unusual or exceptional; that is to
say, different in character from conditions ordinarily and generally brought
about by the winter weather prevalent in the given locality.'"
"'Root v. City of Saratoga Springs, 28 App. Div. 237, 218 N. Y. Supp. 204
(3d Dept. 1926) where the court said: "In the application of this statute a dis-
tinction exists between cases where the dangerous condition was created by the
city and cases where the dangerous condition was caused by agencies for which
the city was not originally responsible. This distinction was clearly pointed out
by this court in Jones v. City of Binghamton (198 App. Div. 193). In the latter
class of cases the statutory notice must be alleged and proved." Taylor v. City
of Albany, 239 App. Div. 217, 267 N. Y. Supp. 903 (3d Dept. 1934), aff'd, 264
N. Y. 539, 191 N. E. 554 (934), where the court said: "The city, jointly with
the railroad company, created this dangerous condition, and is presumed to know
of its own negligent acts. Written notice was unnecessary." See also: Twist v.
City of Rochester, 37 App. Div. 307, 55,N. Y. Supp. 850 (4th Dept. 1899) ;
Wrighter v. Adams Stores, Inc., 232 App. Div. 351, 250 N. Y. Supp. 98 (3d
Dept. g3i); Khoury v. County of Saratoga, 267 N. Y. 384, 196 N. E. 299
(1935).
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held that when the city or its agencies created the dangerous condi-
tion, liability may be imposed without serving the written notice re-
quired by the above statutes. In all other cases, however, the statute
effectively relieves the municipality from liability, for rare is the per-
son who serves upon the authorities a written notice of the particular
place at which he expects to be injured.
There is, apparently, no similar statute affecting Greater New
York where the common law rule still prevails. In Greater New York
no written notice is required and liability is imposed if the city has
actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition of its side-
walks and fails to remedy it within a reasonable time.18
The leading case with reference to liability for snow and ice in
Greater New York is Williams v. City of New York,lsa where the
court reviews a large number of reported cases and reconciles con-
flicting decisions in the First and Second Departments. In that case
"the sidewalk was all covered with snow and hard ice, packed down
and about two inches thick. The snow and ice had been there during
five or six days before the accident. The last snow storm previous
thereto occurred five or six days before and was quite a heavy one.
None of the snow was removed after that snow storm and before the
accident. The condition of the ice was rough where people had packed
down the snow, and ice had formed on top of it. There had been flurries
of snow and rain-little flurries-about two days before the accident."
The court held that these facts showed prima facie (i) a dangerous
and unusual condition of the street, and (2) the lapse of sufficient
time to charge the city with constructive notice of that condition.
There are a number of old cases which have held that a municipality
has no obligation to remove snow and ice unless ridges or mounds of
unusual size are present.19 This doctrine has found more recent ex-
pression,20 although it is not supported by the weight of authority. In
"Guttentag v. City of New York, 154 Misc. 653, 278 N. Y. Supp. 652 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1935) ; Buttmi v. City of New York, 141 Misc. 894, 254 N. Y. Supp. 282
(N. Y. City Ct. 1931). 'a214 N. Y. 259 (1914).
"Buck v. Village of Glens Falls, 4 App. Div. 323, 38 N. Y. Supp. 582 (3d Dept.
i896) ; Anthony v. Village of Glens Falls, 4 App. Div. 218, 41 N. Y. Supp. 1105
(3d Dept. 1896). In the latter case the court said:
"We think the principle may be deemed established by the authorities that a
municipal corporation is not liable for an injury resulting from a smooth coating
of ice on its sidewalks during the winter season where there is no ridge, uneven-
ness or unusual condition of the walk * * * ." [Italics the author's]
'Dwyer v. Woollard, 2o5 App. Div. 546, igg N. Y. Supp. 84o (3d Dept. 1923),
where the court said:
"Munitipalities are not required to remove ice which forms from melting snow,
except where ridges or mounds of unusual size are found. (Anthony v. Village of
Glens Falls, 4 App. Div. 218.) In our case it was not proven that the ice upon
which the plaintiff slipped was other than a level sheet without bumps or ridges."
SNOW AND ICE
the cases where the absence of mounds or ridges has been held to be a
controlling factor it will be observed that the plaintiff fell on a thin
coat of glare ice. The sidewalk in each case had been completely cleared
of snow and the ice was caused by rain or melting snow which, in
freezing weather, had formed small patches of thin ice on the side-
walk. While such decisions are doubtless correct with reference to
the final disposition of the cases before the court, it would seem that
the reasoning is subject to criticism insofar as it states that there is no
liability unless mounds or ridges of unusual size are present. Such a
rule is devoid of relationship to normal standards of conduct and is too
artificial to be perpetuated. Snow or ice of the condition described in
the Williams case is as dangerous to the public as snow which has
formed in mounds or ridges, and there is no practical basis in law or
fact for any doctrine that snow and ice is dangerous only when it
exists in the form of mounds or ridges.
A more plausible reason for denying liability under like circum-
stances is laid down by the court in Taylor v. City of Yonkers:20 a
"When the streets have been wholly or partially cleaned it
often happens that a fall of rain or the melting of adjoining snow
is suddenly followed by severe cold, which covers everything with'
a film or layer of ice and makes the walks slippery and dangerous.
This frozen surface it is practically impossible to remove until a
thaw comes which remedies the evil. The municipality is not neg-
ligent for awaiting that result. It may and should require house-
holders, when the danger is great, to sprinkle upon the surface
ashes or sand or the like, as a measure of prudence and precaution,
but is not responsible for their omission. It is no more bound to
put upon the ice, which it cannot reasonably remove, such foreign
material than to cover it with boards. The emergency is one which
is common to every street in the village or city, and which the
corporation is powerless to combat. Usually it lasts but a few days,
and the corporate authorities may await without negligence a
change of temperature which will remove the danger."
The older cases referred to2ob reach the same conclusion expressed
by the court in the Taylor case, but the reasoning of the opinions is
subject to misinterpretation insofar as it predicates liability upon the
presence or absence of ridges or mounds of unusual size. It will be
observed that liability was imposed in the Williams case'1 although no
mounds or ridges were present, and later cases to the same effect in-
dicate rather conclusively that the presence or absence of mounds or
ridges is not a controlling factor on the question of liability.
°ai5 N. Y. 202, 206 (1887).
2'bSupra note ig.
'Williams v. City of New York, 214 N. Y. 259, io8 N. E. 448 (ii5).
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II. ACTIONS AGAINST ABUTTING OWNERS FOR INJURIES ON
SIDEWALKS
At common law there was no duty on the part of an abutting own-
er to repair the sidewalk in front of his premises or to remove snow
and ice therefrom.22 In almost every town and municipality, however,
the statute provides that abutting owners shall remove snow and ice
from the sidewalks in front of their premises within a certain speci-
fied time.23 Ordinances enacted by various cities, towns and villages
throughout the state are in the nature of police regulations and pro-
vide a fine or penalty for violation thereof. A long line of cases has
held that an abutting owner's neglect to remove snow and ice from
the sidewalk as required by an ordinance does not render him liable
to a party injured but simply subjects him to the penalty provided for
by the ordinance.2 4 The well-settled doctrine that liability for injuries
resulting from a fall on a dangerous accumulation of snow and ice
cannot be imposed on the abutting owner, who had violated an ordi-
nance requiring him to remove the accumulation, seems somewhat at
variance with the general rule that violation of an ordinance is "some
evidence of negligence to be considered by the jury".25 Nevertheless,
'City of Rochester v. Campbell, 123 N. Y. 405, 412, 414-416, 25 N. E. 937
(i8go) ; Krebs v. Heitmann, lO4 App. Div. 173, 189 N. Y. Supp. 954 (2d Dept.
i9o5).
'SECOND CLASS CITIES LAW (1906) § 92. TOWN LAW (1934 § 130, subd. 4.
VILLAGE LAW (1897) § 163. See supra note ii.
'Ryan v. City of Schenectady, 91 Misc. 296, 154 N. Y. Supp. 89o (Sup. Ct.
1915) ; Brotzman v. Lindenfeld, 133 Misc. 832, 234 N. Y. Supp. 79 (1928) ; Lee
v. Ortiz, 249 N. Y. 613, 164 N. E. 604 (1928) ; DeCourcey v. Delapenha & Co.,
i69 App. Div. 551, 156 N. Y. Supp. 112o (Ist Dept 1915).
In City of Rochester v. Campbell, 123 N. Y. 405, 25 N. E. 937 (1896), a person
injured by falling on the sidewalk in front of the defendant's premises sought to
recover damages from the abutting owner for his injuries. The court said:
"At the time of its passage [the ordinance] it was the duty of the city to
remove snow and ice from the sidewalks of its streets, so as to render them
safely passable. The city was then provided with the means and power to dis-
charge that duty. In the exercise of that power it saw fit to provide by ordinance
that the owners and occupants of premises abutting the sidewalks should either
remove the snow and ice therefrom, or be charged with the cost of such removal
if done by its own officers or employes, besides being subjected to a penalty for
each neglect. The property owners were thereby made the agents of the city.
* * * Such being the nature of the duty required, and such being the character of
the ordinance in question, we are of opinion the only liability resting upon the
property owner is that which the ordinance itself imposes, viz., the prescribed
fine or penalty for each neglect, and the cost of removal in every instance of his
refusal or neglect. By enforcing these, every object the ordinance was intended
to accomplish will be attained. The liability of the parties upon whom it operates
extends no further, and against them an action like this cannot be maintained."
"Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., 268 N. Y. 345, 197 N. E. 3o6 (1935).
An interesting editorial entitled Violation of Ordinance as Evidence of Negli-
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it is well established in snow and ice cases that violation of the usual
type of ordinance does not give rise to liability on the part of the
abutting owner.
An exception to this rule may be found in particular cities where
the city charter imposes a duty on the abutting owner to remove snow
and ice from the sidewalks and specifically provides that his failure to
comply with this obligation shall subject him to a suit for damages by
any person injured thereby. The charter of the City of Auburn for
example, contains the following provision:
"The owner or occupant of lands fronting or abutting on any
street, highway, traveled road, public lane, alley or square, shall
make, maintain and repair the sidewalk adjoining his lands and
shall keep such sidewalk and the gutter free and clear of and from
snow, ice and all other obstructions. Such owner or occupant and
each of them, shall be liable for any injury or damage by reason of
omission, failure or negligence to make, maintain or repair such
sidewalk, or to remove snow, ice or other obstructions therefrom,
or for a violation or non-observance of the ordinances relating to
making, maintaining and repairing sidewalks and the removal of
snow, ice and other obstructions from sidewalks, curbstones and
gutters ** *.,25a [Italics the author's.]
A verdict against an abutting owner who bad violated the fore-
going provision of the Charter ,of the City of Auburn by failing to
keep the sidewalk in front of his premises in repair was upheld.26 The
court distinguished the case from other cases in which the charter or
ordinances imposed a duty to keep the sidewalk in good repair and to
remove snow and ice therefrom, pointing out:
"The conclusion we have reached in this case is not in conflict
with the decision made in the Campbell case.27 The charter of the
city of Rochester considered in the Campbell case imposed a duty
upon the owner of a lot or piece of land in the city to keep the side-
walks in good repair and to remove and clear away snow and ice
therefrom. While the duty was imposed as stated, the Rochester
charter did not contain a provision like unto that contained in the
charter of the city of Auburn, creating a liability upon the proper-
ty owner for any injury or damage by reason of a failure to make
such repairs and to maintain the sidewalk as therein provided. ' '27a
The careful practitioner, therefore, must examine the provisions of
the city charter before he can safely determine whether an action may
gence may be found in the N. Y. L. J. October 22, 23, 24, 1935. The subject is
further discussed in the issues of Nov. 25 and Dec. 6, 1935.
zaL. 1879, c. 53, § 113, am. by L. 1897, c. 172.
"Willis v. Parker, 225 N. Y. 159, 121 N. E. 8io (1919).
'City of Rochester v. Campbell, 123 N. Y. 405, 25 N. E. 937 (1890).
2a225 N. Y. i59, 166, 121 N. E. 8io, 86.
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be maintained against an abutting owner for injuries resulting from
a fall on an accumulation of snow and ice on a sidewalk in front of
his premises. If the charter or the ordinance prescribes merely a fine
there is no liability to the injured party; but if the charter should, as
it does in some rare cases, contain a provision similar to the charter
of the city of Auburn, liability may result.
While it is well settled that an abutting owner is generally free
from liability for the natural accumulation of snow and ice on the
sidewalk abutting his premises, he is liable for an accumulation of
snow and ice caused by his "interference with nature". If the abutting
owner, by his own wrongful act, causes an accumulation of snow or
ice upon the sidewalk abutting his premises which renders the side-
walk more dangerous, he may be held liable for negligence. Under this
principle, liability has been imposed on the abutting owner:
x. When a leader from the roof of his premises discharges water on
the sidewalk causing ice to accumulate thereon ;28
2. When the absence of a gutter or pipe permits water to flow from
the roof of the abutting premises causing ice to form on the sidewalk ;29
3. When a roof overhanging the sidewalk causes snow to be pre-
cipitated on the sidewalk ;3o
4. When a sign or a railing on the abutting premises causes snow to
accumulate thereon. and, in melting, form ice upon the sidewalk ;31
5. When the roof of a baywindow collects and discharges snow and
water on the sidewalk ;32
6. When an awning or projection of any type can be said to create
a condition which renders the sidewalk more dangerous.33
The above examples are by no means complete and are cited to
show the type of interference which may render an abutting owner
liable in negligence. Whenever it can be shown that the abutting owner
made the sidewalk more dangerous by reason of any interference with
natural conditions a jury question is presented. Such cases are readily
'Tremblay v. Harmony Mills, 171 N. Y. 598, 64 N. E. 50 (1902).
'Crounse v. Sager, 224 App. Div. io, 229 N. Y. Supp. 45, (3d Dept. 1928).
'Klepper v. Seymour, 246 N. Y. 85, 158 N. E. 29 (927).
"Venable v. Consolidated Drygoods Co., 225 App. Div. 202, 232 N. Y. Supp.
4o4 (2d Dept. 1929).
'Parsons v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 233 App. Div. i95, 251 N. Y.
Supp. 360 (4th Dept. i93i).
'McConnell v. Bostelman, 72 Hun 238 (Sup. Ct 893); RESTATEMENT,
TORTS, § 35o. There have been innumerable cases of pedestrians who have sus-
tained injuries from falling on snow and ice, but apparently few have been
injured by snow and ice falling on them. An interesting editorial entitled Injuries
from siow and ice falling from roofs will be found in the N. Y. L. J. Feb. IO,
1936. The leading case in this state on this subject is Klepper v. Seymour, 246
N. Y. 85, i58 N. E. 29 (927).
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distinguishable in principle from those cases which seek to hold the
abutting owner liable for a natural accumulation of snow and ice on a
sidewalk. The sidewalk is owned by the city and, as we have observed
above, the primary obligation of maintaining the sidewalk in a safe
and passable condition is upon the city. This primary obligation cannot
be delegated to the abutting property owner who is relieved from li-
ability unless, by his own neglect, he does something which makes the
sidewalk more dangerous.
III. ACTIONS AGAINST PROPERTY OWNERS FOR INJURIES ON
THEIR PREMISES
The superficial similarity between snow and ice on a public side-
walk, and snow and ice on the walk, approach or steps on private
property resulted in a number of decisions which held that the prop-
erty owner is not liable for injuries caused by a natural accumulation
of snow and ice on his premises. In Little v. Wirth34 the court un-
equivocally states:
"The authorities are uniform that there is no duty on the part
of an owner to a tenant, or the public, to remove from the steps or
walk the ice and snow which naturally accumulates thereon."
'The court cites several New York cases3 5 to substantiate this state-
ment but an inspection of the cases cited reveals that every one of them
involves an action against an abutting owner for injuries on a public
sidewalk.3 6 Corpus furis makes a similar assertion, supported only by
sidewalk cases.37 An examination of the cases cited in support of this
doctrine&8 will show that all of them are actions against abutting own-
ers for injuries on sidewalks or cases based on such decisions. This
16 Misc. 3O, 268 N. Y. Supp. 1iO (Super. Ct. 1894).
'Fuchs v. Schmidt, 8 Daly 317 (Comm. Pleas I879) ; Moore v. Gadsden, 93
N.Y. 12 (1883) ; Wenzlick v. McCotter, 87 N. Y. 122 (1881) ; City v. Campbell,
123 N. Y. 405, 25 N. E. 937 (I89o).
5
'Two of the cases cited, viz. Moore v. Gadsden, 93 N. Y. 12 (1883) ; and-
Wenzlick v. McCotter, 87 N. Y. I2z (1881), were distinguished in Tremblay
v! Harmony Mills, 171 N. Y. 598, 64 N. E. 5ol (1902).
'In 36 C. J. (1924), § 903, p. 220, it is said:
"According to the weight of authority, there is no duty on the part of the
landlord to his tenant to remove from the roof, steps or walk snow or ice which
naturally accumulates thereon and he is not liable for injuries caused thereby.
The rule applies also to such natural accumulations upon sidewalks adjacent to
houses rented to several tenants."
'Rochester v. Campbell, 123 N. Y. 405, 25 N. E. 937 (189o) ; Moore v. Gads-
den, 93 N. Y. 12 (1883) ; Wenzlick v. McCotter, 87 N. Y. 122 (1881) ; Fuchs v.
Schmidt, 8 Daly 317 (Comm. Pleas, 1879); Little v. Wirth, 6 Misc. 3Ol, 268
N. Y. Supp. IIiO (Super. Ct. 1894); Gianpaola v. Paoli, 129 N. Y. Supp. i8o
(App. Term, 1911).
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doctrine has also found expression in later cases,3 9 but when such cases
are run back to their source it will be observed that all of them are
based upon a misconception of the rule stated in sidewalk cases. Such
authorities fail to recognize that the fundamental reasons which under-
ly the exemption of abutting owners have no application to injuries
on private property.
The abutting owner, it will be recalled, is relieved from liability for
injuries sustained on a sidewalk because the primary obligation to
maintain the sidewalk is upon the municipality. This reasoning has
no application to injuries which occur on his own premises, where
the owner himself has the primary obligation to maintain his property
in a reasonably safe condition. To subject a property owner to liability
to every stranger passing his premises on the public sidewalk would
be unduly harsh and burdensome. The sidewalks are used by the
public generally, while the owner is obligated to keep his own premises
in a reasonably safe condition for the benefit of only a limited number
of individuals, to wit, "invitees".
To "trespassers" the owner owes the limited obligation to refrain
from "wilfully or wantonly" injuring them.40
The owner's obligation to a "licensee" is substantially the same as
to a "trespasser", i. e., to refrain from inflicting wilful or wanton in-
jury. A "licensee" takes thd property on which he enters "as he finds
it" and assumes all the ordinary risks incident to its condition. At the
most, the owner owes the duty to warn of defects which are known to
him and unlikely to be discovered by the "licensee". 41 Only to "in-
vitees" does the owner owe the obligation to maintain his premises in
a reasonably safe condition.42
It is evident, therefore, that neither a "trespasser" nor a "licensee"
can maintain an action against the property owner for injuries caused
by snow and ice. Whether the injury was caused by a natural accumu-
lation or by some act of the owner constituting an interference with
nature is immaterial so long as there is no wilful or wanton injury.
While the principles of law applicable to "licensees" and "invitees"
are well settled, it is no easy matter to ascertain to which class an
individual belongs. The line of demarcation is shadowy and indistinct,
and the courts have indulged in a veritable maze of finespun and
often contradictory distinctions between a "mere licensee", a "bare
licensee", a "passive licensee", a "licensee by invitation" and a "licen-
'Dwyer v. Woollard, 205 App. Div. 546, i99 N. Y. Supp. 84o (3d Dept. 1923).
'REsTA"EImENT, ToRTs, § 333.
"RESTATEMENT, ToRTs, §§ 331, 332, 342.
'RESTATEMFNT, TORTS, § 343.
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see with an interest". 43 A social guest invited to a private home is not
an "invitee" as might be supposed, but a "licensee". 44 A person who
visits a tenant in an apartment house is a "licensee" with respect to
ihe tenant but an "invitee" with respect to the landlord.45
Much of this confusion in terminology is clarified by the new
classification in the American Law Institute's Restatement, Law of
Torts. The classical grouping of "licensee" and "invitee" is abandoned
in favor of a new classification of "gratuitous licensees" and "business
visitors". 4 The new terminology seems to be a definite improvement,
for, although the rules of liability are essentially the same, the phrase
"business visitors" is a more appropriate description of persons com-
monly classified as "invitees". 47
There seems to be no sound reason for relieving a property owner
from the obligation of keeping his premises in a reasonably safe con-
dition for the protection of persons who can be classified as "invitees"
or "business visitors". The courts have repeatedly said:
"The general rule applicable to persons occupying real property
for business purposes is that they must use reasonable prudence
and care to keep their property in such condition that those who
go there shall not be unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed to
danger. The measure of their duty is reasonable prudence and
care."
48
It would seem that the owner's obligation to exercise "reasonable or
ordinary care" should require him to remove snow and ice within a
reasonable time, just as it requires him to see that the steps shall not
become loose and rotten ;49 that a defective carpet on a stairway shall
be repaired,50 and that any dangerous condition should be remedied. 5 '
"Heskill v. Auburn Light Co., 2o9 N. Y. 86, io2 N. E. 540 (913); 45 C. J.
§ 194, pp. 789-93.
"45 C. J. § 97, p. 794.
"Harris v. Parry, 89 N. Y. 308 (1882); 45 C. J. § 220, p. 81o.
"RESTATEmENT, TORTS, §§ 331, 333, 342, 343.
"
1In the RESTATEMENT, a social guest of a tenant in an apartment house
is a "gratuitous licensee" with respect to the tenant, but a "business visitor" with
respect to the landlord. RESTATEmENT, TORTS, § 332-h. The New York annota-
tions of the Restatement have not yet been published.
"Flynn v. C. R. R. Co., i42 N. Y. 439, 37 N. E. 514 (1894) ; Larkin v. O'Neill,
iig N. Y. 225, 23 N. E. 878 (18go); Newell v. Bartlett, 114 N. Y. 399, 2I N. E.
99o (i88?) ; Hart v. Grennell, 122 N. Y. 37, 25 N. E. 354 (i8gi) ; Ackert v.
Lansing, 59 N. Y. 646 (1874).
"Brady v. Valentine, 3 Misc. 20, 21 N. Y. Supp. 776 (1893).
"Piehl v. Reinhart, 127 N. Y. 381, 27 N. E. O77 (i89i).
"Pitman v. City of New York, 141 App. Div. 67o, 125 N. Y. Supp. 941 (2d
Dept i9io) ; Goodman v. Silverman, 231 App. Div. 84, 246 N. Y. Supp. 319 (Ist
Dept i93o).
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Many later authorities have, under similar circumstances, ignored
the decisions which declare that there is no liability for a natural ac-
cumulation of snow and ice on private premises and have declared that
the owner's obligation is to exercise reasonable care. In what is per-
haps a typical case, 52 plaintiff, a tenant, sued the landlord for personal
injuries sustained by falling on the front steps of the premises. He tes-
tified that while he was descending the front steps at about twelve
thirty in the afternoon, he slipped on the ice thereon. The step on
which he slipped was covered with ice. The other steps were about
the same. It had stopped snowing at seven in the morning. The trial
court, at the close of plaintiff's case, granted the defendant's motion
for a directed verdict. In reversing the judgment of the trial court,
the appellate court said:
"having possession and control of the stoop of his tenement
house, it was the duty of the owner to use reasonable care so as to
keep it in a safe condition, and upon the record presented in this
case it was a question for the jury whether he had performed that
duty."52 a
A number of other cases have expressed the same principle. 53
Of course, the duty to exercise reasonable care does not mean that
the premises must under all circumstances be kept free from any ac-
cumulation of snow or ice. Many claims have been dismissed on the
ground that the property owner had insufficient notice of the slippery
condition or had insufficient time to remedy it. In a recent case decided
by the Court of Appeals,54 the plaintiff, a tenant, slipped on the steps
while leaving the apartment house in which she lived. She left the
house about three in the afternoon. According to her testimony, it had
been raining and freezing on the morning of the accident but the ice
had been on the steps only four or five hours prior to the time she
fell. The records of the Weather Bureau showed that there had been no
rain in the morning but that the rain began about noon. A verdict was
rendered for the plaintiff but the Court of Appeals reversed the judg-
ment on the ground that the defendant had no notice that the steps were
icy, that the condition had not continued long enough to charge him
with notice and he had insufficient time to remedy the condition. The
'Albert v. Wachsmann, et aL., i69 N. Y. Supp. 138 (App. Term, x8).
"ax69 N. Y. Supp. 138.
'Weston v. New York Elevated R. R. Co., 73 N. Y. 595 (1878) ; McGuire v.
Interborough Rapid Transit Co., io4 App. Div. 1o5, 93 N. Y. Supp. 3x6 (2d
Dept. Io5) ; Olopp v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 69 Misc. 595, 126 N. Y.
Supp. 184 (App. Term, igio) ; Harkin v. Crumbie, 2o Misc. 568, 46 N. Y. Supp.
453 (App. Term, 897).
'Rankin v. Ittner Realty Company, Inc., 24 N. Y. 339, 15i N. E. 641 (1926).
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inference from the opinion is, that if the landlord had notice of the
icy condition, or if it had existed for sufficient time to offer oppor-
tunity to remedy it, a case would have been presented for the jury.
Similar decisions have been made in a number of other cases.55
The doctrine that the owner of property is required to use reasonable
care in its maintenance has been of almost universal application. The
courts have held that a question for a jury is presented when granite
steps have, from long use, been worn very smooth and slippery ;54
when a hallway was slippery after having been cleaned with hot soapy
water ;57 and when the janitor of a tenerpent house washed slush off
the steps in freezing weather, causing the steps to be covered with a
OIn McAuley v. United Cigar Stores Co., 204 App. Div. 356, 198 N. Y. Supp.
,54 (ist Dept. 1923), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 633, 142 N. E. 313 (1923), the plaintiff
fell at the entrance of defendant's cigar store by reason of an accumulation of
snow and ice at the entrance. The evidence showed that plaintiff fell at about
eleven o'clock in the evening. According to the records of the Weather Bureau
it had been snowing all day and up until 10:50 P. M. and continued sleeting there-
after, with a high wind blowing all the time. The court held that the defendant
had insufficient time before the accident in which to remove the ice and snow.
In Kelly v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 112 N. Y. 443, 2o N. E. 383 (1889), plaintiff
fell on a stairway between 5:3o and 6 :oo o'clock in the evening. The storm had
ceased at three or four o'clock on the same day. The court held that the defendant
was not required to throw ashes or sawdust upon the steps while the storm
conthuwed because the continuance of the storm would soon render the steps as
slippery as before. The storm had ceased only an hour and a half before the
accident and the court said:
"So brief a period as that, at such a time in the night, cannot, we think, be re-
garded as any evidence of a lack of that reasonable care which the defendant was
bound to exercise."
In Goodman v. Silverman, 231 App. Div. 84, 246 N. Y. Supp. 319 (ist Dept.
193o), the slippery condition of the steps had existed for about an hour. The
court held that it would be unreasonable to hold the defendant liable for failure
to inspect within so short a period of time.
In Gianpaola v. Paoli, 129 N. Y. Supp. i8o (App. Term, 1911) the plaintiff
fell on the icy steps of a tenement house. There was no proof as to how long the
ice was permitted to remain on the steps. The weather reports showed that sleet
and rain had been falling and freezing on the ground constantly for a period of
two days prior to the accident. A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed and
a new trial ordered because there was insufficient proof that the landlord had
sufficient time to remedy the condition.
To the same effect see: Rusk v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 46,App. Div. ioo, 6I N.
Y. Supp. 384 (1st Dept. 1899); Venable v. Consolidated Dry Goods Co., 225
App. Div. 202, 232 N. Y. Supp. 404 (2d Dept. 1929) ; Palmer v. Pennsylvania
Co., iii N. Y. 488, 18 N. E. 859 (1889); Laufers Weiler v. Borchardt, 88 N. Y.
Supp. 985 (App. Term, 19o4).
'Pitman v. City of New York, 141 App. Div. 670, 125 N. Y. Supp. 941 (2d
Dept. igio).
'Beech v. Weber, 123 Misc. 926, 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 718 (App. Term, 1924).
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thin glaze of smooth slippery ice.58 It would seem that ordinary pru-
dence and a proper regard for persons lawfully on the property would
require the property owner to take reasonable precautions to remove
snow and ice from his walk or steps or to cover the ice with sand or
ashes. To hold that the owner of a large store, hotel, theatre or any
other building used by the public, owes no duty whatever to remove
a natural accumulation of snow and ice from its approaches, would
encourage a disregard for public safety. The standard of care required
will necessarily vary with the nature of the use of the premises. One
entering a store, theatre, office building or hotel is entitled to expect
that greater precautions to secure his safety will be made than when
entering a private dwelling. 59
As Mr. Justice Cardozo has said in one of his essays, the law, in
charging one with a duty, should 'shape its rules in the light of "the
common standards of conduct, the every-day beliefs and practices, of
'Jankowsky v. Brown, 177 App. Div. 602, 164 N. Y. Supp. 3o3 (Ist Dept.
1917).
'Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 232 App. Div. 53, 248 N. Y. Supp.
491 (4th Dept. I93i). In the REsTATEmENT, ToRTs, § 343-e, it is said: "In deter-
mining the extent of preparation which a business visitor is entitled to expect to
be made for his protection, the nature of the land and the purposes for which it
is used are of great importance. One who enters a private residence even for
purposes connected with the owner's business, is entitled to expect only such
preparation as a reasonably prudent householder makes for the reception.of such
visitors. On the other hand, one entering a store, theatre, office building or hotel,
is entitled to expect that his host will make far greater preparations to secure
the safety of his patrons than a householder will make for his social or even his
business visitors."
There is no satisfactory discussion in the reported cases in this state with
reference to the obligation of the owner of a private dwelling to remove snow and
ice for the protection of "social guests". Apparently the only recent reported case
is Greene v. Greene, 212 App. Div. 38r, 2o8 N. Y. Supp. 689 (ist Dept. 1925), in
which the plaintiff was invited to attend a party at the defendant's residence.
While walking up the porch steps she slipped and fell. The accident happened
at 7:30 in the evening and there was some snow and ice on the steps, but the
evidence indicated that it had stopped snowing only a short time before the acci-
dent. The court did not attempt to define the liability of the householder, but
stated only that he was not required to use greater care than a storekeeper, and
upheld the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the condition of the
steps had not existed for sufficient time to impose upon the property owner an
obligation to remove it.
The dearth of reported cases on this subject is undoubtedly due to the fact
that, unless the defendant is insured, few persons are inclined to sue a private
householder for failure to clean his walks, and few juries would impose liability
on a property owner for an injury under such circumstances. On principle, it
would seem that there is no obligation to a "social guest" or "licensee' who must
take the premises "as he finds them", although a jury question might be presented
in the case of a person who could be classified as a "business visitor".
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the average man or woman whose behavior it assumes to regulate." In
the days of kerosene lamps and the horse and cutter, the removal of
snow was something of a novelty. Decisions made in the light of that
background cannot safely be relied on to measure present-day stand-
ards of conduct. It is common practice today for the owners of public
buildings promptly to remove snow and ice from the approaches and
the decisions which require such property owners to make reasonable
effort to remove snow and ice from their premises do no more than
impose a duty commensurate with existing standards of conduct.
